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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Within pages 1 and 2 of its Brief, dated March 17, 1993, the 
Appellee ("Defendant") has set forth an alternative Statement of 
the Issues Presented for Review, although Defendant has indicated 
no dissatisfaction with Appellant's ("Alumbaugh") statement of 
the issues within her principal Brief. 
Alumbaugh objects to Defendant's Statement of the Issues 
on the grounds that Defendant's Issues 1 and 2 are redundant, and 
on the grounds that Defendant's Issues fail to address some of 
the key issues which Alumbaugh raised in her principal Brief; for 
example, Defendant does not address Alumbaugh's argument that 
she has exhausted her administrative remedies by pursuing such 
remedies up to the level of judicial review; nor does Defendant 
address Alumbaugh's argument that her statutory administrative 
remedies are futile because the Utah Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act provides no remedy or enforcement mechanism for 
the injuries alleged by Alumbaugh; nor does Defendant address 
Alumbaugh1 s argument that she is not required to exhaust her 
statutory administrative remedies prior to bringing her 
constitutional and common-law claims because such claims are 
independent from Alumbaugh's statutory remedies. 
Defendant raises two issues in its Brief that were not 
raised in the District Court or in Alumbaugh's principal Brief. 
First, Defendant argues at page 5, note 1, and page 14, that 
Harold C. Yancey, in his official capacity, has not been named as. 
a Defendant in this action* Second, Defendant argues on pages 
14-18 and 21-22 of its Brief that Alumbaugh's claims under the 
Utah Constitution and for breach of contract are barred by the 
notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
63-30-1 et seq. These new issues will be addressed below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant sets forth an alternative Statement of Relevant 
Facts on pages 4-5 of its Brief, although Defendant does not 
indicate any disagreement with the Statement of the Facts 
appearing on pages 4-15 of Alumbaugh's Brief. 
Alumbaugh objects to Defendant's Statement of Relevant Facts 
on the grounds that it consists mostly of legal argument. For 
example, Defendant's Statement of Facts contains the following: 
Withou t a w a i t i n g a f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n of h e r 
grievance procedure, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d the i n s t an t ac t ion 
a l l eg ing tha t her cons t i t u t i ona l r i g h t s to due process 
were v i o l a t e d unde r b o t h t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s . The sole defendant in t h i s ac t ion i s 
t h e " U t a h S t a t e I n s u r a n c e D e p a r t m e n t . . . . " 
Ms. Alumbaugh's p e t i t i o n for j u d i c i a l review of the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e s s has y e t t o be 
resolved. (Footnote de le ted . ) 
Elsewhere in i t s Brief, Defendant e r roneous ly s t a t e s t h a t 
Alumbaugh's claims in t h i s ac t ion a r i s e from al leged def ic ienc ies 
in her adminis t ra t ive grievance procedures. For example, on page 
10 of i t s Brief, Defendant s t a t e s : 
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F u r t h e r , i n H a t t o n - W a r d , t h e C o u r t e x p r e s s l y 
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t M r . H a t t o n - W a r d was n o t s e e k i n g 
r e i n s t a t e m e n t o r a n y o t h e r r e l i e f r e l a t e d t o t h e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e s s . I n s t e a d , i t was t h e 
d e f e n d a n t who c l a i m e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f must f i r s t go 
t h r o u g h t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s b e f o r e f i l i n g a 
s e p a r a t e , d i s t i n c t , c a u s e of a c t i o n u n r e l a t e d i n a n y 
m a n n e r t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s . B u t 
Ms . A l u m b a u g h , r a t h e r t h a n b r i n g i n g a n e n t i r e l y 
s e p a r a t e c a u s e of a c t i o n , i s i n s t e a d c l a i m i n g t h a t she 
w a s d e n i e d c o n t r a c t u a l , s t a t e , a n d f e d e r a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d u e p r o c e s s iri t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
g r i e v a n c e p r o c e s s . 
P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h a t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d 
c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s t o due p r o c e s s were v i o l a t e d by t h e 
manner i n wh ich t h e p r i o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g was 
h a n d l e d . (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) 
Alumbaugh r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d b o t h i n t h e D i s t r i c t Cour t and 
i n h e r p r i n c i p a l B r i e f t h a t h e r p r e s e n t c l a i m s do n o t i n v o l v e any 
a l l e g e d d e f i c i e n c i e s i n h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e s s . I n 
f a c t , Alumbaugh w i l l c o n c e d e , a r g u e n d o , f o r p u r p o s e s of t h i s 
A p p e a l , t h a t t h e r e w e r e no d e f i c i e n c i e s i n h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e . Her p r e s e n t c l a i m s a l l i n v o l v e a l l e g e d 
m i s c o n d u c t b y h e r e m p l o y e r , t h e U t a h S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t of 
I n s u r a n c e , i n i n v o l u n t a r i l y t r a n s f e r r i n g Alumbaugh, i n g i v i n g h e r 
a d e r o g a t o r y p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n , and i n e x c l u d i n g h e r from 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a p r o m o t i o n . 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALUMBAUGHfS 
CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
Alumbaugh argued in the District Court and in her principal 
Brief three reasons why her claims should not be dismissed for 
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies, none of which have 
been addressed by Defendant. They are: 
1. That Alumbaugh has fully exhausted any administrative 
remedies that might be required in this case. The fact is 
undisputed that Alumbaugh pursued her grievance through the first 
four levels of the grievance procedure, and then timely appealed 
to the Utah Career Service Review Board, which held that it had 
no jurisdiction over Alumbaugh's claims. It is undisputed that 
Alumbaugh1 s only avenue of redress at this point is in the 
District Court. Since that is the case, Alumbaugh's 
administrative remedies have been exhausted and she should be 
allowed to proceed in the District Court with any claims which 
are appropriate in that forum. 
2. Alumbaugh should be excused from exhausting her 
administrative remedies because such remedies are futile. 
Alumbaugh argued in the District Court and in her principal 
Brief, and Defendant has not disputed, that the Utah Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures Act contains only sparse and indirect 
references to any remedies, none of which are applicable to 
Alumbaugh, and contains no enforcement mechanism. Alumbaugh 
should not be required to further exhaust a process which 
provides her with no potential remedy. 
3. Alumbaugh is not required to exhaust her administrative 
remedies under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act prior to 
. 4 . 
bringing her present claims, because her present claims are 
independent and distinct from her statutory remedies. This 
Court held in Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 82 8 P.2d 
1071 (Utah App. 1992) that it is not necessary for civil service 
employees to exhaust their administrative remedies where they 
seek independent remedies outside of the administrative process. 
Essential to the Court's analysis in Hat ton-Ward was the fact 
that the civil service statute involved in that case provided 
only limited remedies, of a different nature than those sought by 
the Plaintiff in his independent action. Id. at 1073. 
Defendant's sole response to Hatton-Ward is to state 
that Alumbaugh, unlike the Plaintiff in Hatton-Ward, claims 
injuries arising from the administrative process itself. 
Appellant Brief, pages 9-11. However, as stated above, this 
allegation is manifestly untrue. Alumbaugh1s present claims 
derive solely from alleged wrongful conduct of her employer, 
specifically, in involuntarily transferring Alumbaugh, issuing 
her a derogatory performance appraisal, and excluding her from 
consideration for a promotion. Alumbaugh's administrative 
grievance procedure is not involved in this action. 
Alumbaugh's argument on this point is particularly 
strong as to her claim under 42 USC Section 1983 because, as 
discussed within Alumbaugh's principal Brief, exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies is generally not required for 
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Section 1983 claims. See Brief of Appellant, pages 20-21, and 
cases cited therein. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALUMBAUGHfS 
CLAIM UNDER 42 USC SECTION 1983. 
Defendant's argument in relation to Alumbaugh's Section 19 83 
claim has changed considerably over the course of this action. 
Within its initial Memorandum in the District Court, Defendant's 
argument on this point was as follows: 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant has violated her 
due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in 
breaching her contract of employment. However, the 
United States Supreme Court has recently held that 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 does not apply to states and their 
officials. In Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), 
the Court held that "neither a State nor its officials 
acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under 
Section 1983. Id., at 71. The result is that suit 
cannot be brought under Section 19 83 against a State or 
its officials in their official capacity because the 
statute does not provide for a cause of action against 
parties other than "persons." Since defendant Utah 
State Insurance Department and Harold C. Yancey in his 
official capacity as Commissioner are improper parties 
in a Section 1983 action, plaintiff's Section 1983 
a c t i o n s h o u l d be dismissed. (Emphasis 
added.) (R. 17.) 
After Alumbaugh filed a responsive memorandum, in which she 
cited footnote 10 of the Will case, which essentially states that 
official-capacity actions against state officials for injunctive 
relief are permissible under Section 1983, Defendant filed a 
reply memorandum, wherein the sum of Defendant's argument on this 
point was as follows: 
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Plaintiff cites footnote 10 of the opinion in Will 
v, Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) which notes an 
exception to the general rule that a State is not a 
person under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Will explains 
that "'official-capacity action for prospective relief 
are not treated as actions against the State.111 Id. 
(quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, n. 14 
(1985)). Thus, injunctive relief against the State 
may be available under Section 1983, but damages are 
not available. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint does 
not seek prospective relief. Rather, plaintiff 
requests this Court to adjudicate whether the State 
violated her due process rights when she was 
transferred to another position of employment within 
the State agency. Plaintiff requests the following 
relief: (1) for reinstatement to the position of 
employment she would otherwise have had; (2) an 
injunction against further constitutional violations; 
(3) lost wages and benefits; (4) compensatory damages; 
(5) legal costs; and (6), attorneys fees. Because the 
relief plaintiff seeks against the State is unavailable 
under Section 1983, plaintiff's claim should be 
dismissed. (Footnote deleted, emphasis added.) 
In its present Brief, Defendant apparently abandons the 
arguments which it raised in the District Court, and instead 
argues for the first time that Alumbaugh has failed to name 
Harold C. Yancey as a Defendant in his official capacity in this 
action. 
Alumbaugh objects to this argument being made for the first 
time on Appeal. If Defendant had raised this issue in the 
District Court, any technical deficiency in Alumbaughfs Complaint 
could have been cured through a minor amendment.1 Instead, 
District Court made no determination as to Defendant's 
argument under Section 19 83. The District Court's decision was 
based exclusively upon the exhaustion of remedies issue. 
(R. 123-124.) 
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D e f e n d a n t t o o k t h e p o s i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t Yancey had 
b e e n named i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y , and t h a t t h e S t a t e of U t a h 
c o u l d b e a D e f e n d a n t u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 9 8 3 f o r p u r p o s e s of 
" p r o s p e c t i v e " i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f . 
S e c o n d , a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , A l u m b a u g h ' s C o m p l a i n t 
s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a t e s a c l a i m a g a i n s t Y a n c e y i n h i s o f f i c i a l 
c a p a c i t y . The Compla in t names a s D e f e n d a n t "Utah S t a t e I n s u r a n c e 
D e p a r t m e n t , b y a n d t h r o u g h i t s C o m m i s s i o n e r a n d A u t h o r i z e d 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , H a r o l d C. Y a n c e y . " T h i s d e s i g n a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
i d e n t i f i e s Y a n c e y a s a D e f e n d a n t i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y . 
Alumbaugh may have more a r t f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e 
and i t s O f f i c i a l i n h e r C ompla in t and s u b s e q u e n t d o c u m e n t s , a s 
c o u l d h a v e t h e D e f e n d a n t . Any c o n f u s i o n on t h i s p o i n t may b e 
due t o t h e f a c t t h a t a c t i o n s a g a i n s t S t a t e o f f i c i a l s a r e o f t e n 
c o n s t r u e d a s a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e i t s e l f . See W i l l , 491 
U . S . a t 7 1 . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Y a n c e y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y named a s a 
D e f e n d a n t i n A l u m b a u g h ' s C o m p l a i n t , wh ich C o m p l a i n t s h o u l d b e 
l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n A lumbaugh ' s f a v o r . G i l l v . Timm, 72 0 P . 2 d 
1352 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . 
I I I . THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALUMBAUGH'S 
STATE DUE PROCESS CLAIM. 
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s on p a g e s 1 4 - 1 7 o f i t s B r i e f t h a t 
A lumbaugh ' s c l a i m f o r v i o l a t i o n of h e r r i g h t of due p r o c e s s u n d e r 
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Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution should be 
dismissed for failure to comply with the notice and undertaking 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Actf UCA Section 
63-30-12 and 13. Defendant admits on page 17, note 2 of its 
Brief that this issue was not raised in the District Court. The 
District Court clearly did not consider this issue in its Order 
of Dismissal. (R. 123-124.) 
Defendant assumes without discussion that the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act applies to Alumbaugh's claim under the 
Utah State Constitution. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recently held that the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply 
to claims which are based upon State constitutional provisions 
which are self-executing. Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 
P.2d 622, 630-635 (Utah 1990). Much of the Supreme Court's 
lengthy analysis of Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution in Coleman is equally applicable to Alumbaugh's 
claim for deprivation of her property interest in employment 
under the Due Process Clause of the Utah State Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is, with certain 
exceptions, self-executing. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
- 9 -
of Fed. Bur, of Narc, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971); Davis 
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (1979).2 
Decisions of the Federal courts under the Due Process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may be relied 
upon by the Utah courts in construing Article I, Section 7. 
Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Industrial Com'n, 649 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1982); Untermeyer v. State Tax Com'n, 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 
1942) . In fact, a direct cause of action under the Utah Due 
Process Clause should be more readily available than under the 
Federal clauses because of the "Open Courts" provision of the 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, under which any 
alternative remedy must provide full relief to an injured person 
before it can abrogate an existing legal remedy. Condemarin 
v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 369 (Utah 1989).3 
^Defendant relies upon Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 
S.Ct. 2404 (1983), wherein the United States Supreme Court held 
that a claim directly under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not available to a Federal Civil Service 
employee because of the alternative remedies provided by the 
Federal Civil Service laws. However, Bush is distinguishable 
from the present case because, unlike the Federal Civil Service 
laws, the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act contains no 
apparent remedies or enforcement mechanism. Therefore, the 
present case is more closely analogous to Davis v. Passman, 
supra. 
^The effect of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act upon 
Federal Due Process claims was briefly considered by this Court 
in DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 
App. 1992). However, the Court was not required to resolve this 
issue due to its affirmance of the trial court's determination 
that the Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated. 
- 10 -
Moreover, claims for equitable relief are expressly excluded 
from the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by UCA Section 
63-30-2(1), which defines "claim" as "any claim or cause of 
action for money or damages. • . ." See Bennett v. Bow Valley 
Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 424 (Utah 1990) and El Rancho 
Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977). 
Therefore, Alumbaugh's claims for equitable relief are not 
subject to the Act. 
Defendant argues in the alternative on pages 18-21 of its 
Brief that the Court should not allow a cause of action under 
Article I, Section 7 in the present case because of the 
alternative remedy which is provided by the Utah Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act. Defendant apparently concedes that, under 
Federal law, a direct cause of action under the Due Process 
clauses may be available in the absence of any other adequate 
remedy. However, Defendant argues under the authority of Bush 
v. Lucas, supra, at note 2, that such a cause of action should 
not be allowed in the present case because of the alternative 
remedies provided by the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Act. 
Defendant's argument fails to address Alumbaugh's argument 
that the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act contains no 
apparent remedies or enforcement mechanism. Alumbaugh briefed 
- 11 -
this issue at length in the District Court (R. 96-102) and in her 
principal Brief, page 24, and Defendant has not disputed this 
point. In fact, the Jurisdictional Decision of the Career 
Service Review Board states in dictum that the Act contains no 
remedy for the injuries alleged by Alumbaugh. (R. 52-53.) It is 
apparent from an examination of the Act itself that it contains 
little, if any, in the way of remedies or enforcement. The Act 
should properly be construed as an optional procedure for 
facilitating negotiating and compromise, supplemental to any 
other remedies which may be available at law. 
Finally, Defendant argues on page 21 of its Brief: 
If, on the other hand, Ms. Alumbaugh claims that 
the statutes themselves do not afford adequate due 
process, she can challenge the constitutionality of the 
statutes by seeking judicial review of the 
administrative proceeding. Vance v. Fordham 671 P.2d 
124 (Utah 1983). 
Alumbaugh may have a claim that the Utah Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act violates Due Process if the Act is 
construed as Alumbaugh1s exclusive remedy under State law. 
However, such a claim would be unrelated to the issues in the 
present case, which involve Defendant's violation of Alumbaugh1s 
contractual property interest in her employment. Challenging the 
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Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act would not provide a 
remedy for the injuries which Alumbaugh alleges in this action.^ 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALUMBAUGHfS 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
Defendant argued in the District Court, and in its Brief at 
pages 21-24, that Alumbaugh has failed to state a claim for 
breach of an implied contract of employment arising from the 
Employee Handbook and Rules which have been published by the Utah 
Department of Human Resource Management.5 The District Court did 
not decide this issue, having based its decision exclusively on 
the exhaustion of remedies issue. 
The essence of Defendant's argument is that, as a civil 
service employee, Alumbaugh's employment is governed by statute 
and not by contract. However, Defendant's argument misconstrues 
the nature of Alumbaugh's contract claims. Such claims are not 
based upon the civil service statutes, but upon the Employee 
Handbook and Rules published by the Utah Department of Human 
^The constitutionality of the Utah Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act may be implicated in this action. Should the 
Court determine that the Act provides Alumbaugh's exclusive 
remedy, then the adequacy of the Act's remedies under Article I, 
Sections 7 and 22 is brought into issue under Alumbaugh's State 
Due Process claim. 
^The specific provisions of the Employee Handbook and Rules 
relied upon by Alumbaugh were set forth verbatim in Alumbaugh's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 
March 11, 1992, pages 6-13. (R. 30-37.) 
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R e s o u r c e Management in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
a u t h o r i t y under the c i v i l s e r v i c e s t a t u t e s . The re i s no 
a l l ega t i on in t h i s case tha t the Employee Handbook or Rules are 
i n c o n s i s t e n t in any way w i t h t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e s t a t u t e s . 
Therefore, Alumbaugh may reasonably claim pro tec t ion of both the 
c i v i l serv ice s t a t u t e s and of an implied cont rac t of employment, 
in accordance with Berube v . Fashion Centre, Ltd . , 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 19 89) . 
The Utah Supreme Court i n d i r e c t l y addres sed t h i s i s s u e 
in Thurston v . Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992). In 
Thurston, the P l a in t i f f a l leged tha t the County had breached an 
i m p l i e d c o n t r a c t of employment, a r i s i n g from i t s Personnel 
Po l ic ies and Procedures Manual, in s e l ec t i ng the P l a i n t i f f for a 
r e d u c t i o n - i n - f o r c e ("RIF") . The D i s t r i c t Court g r an t ed the 
County's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds t h a t the 
County had n o t , as a m a t t e r of law, v i o l a t e d the procedures 
es tab l i shed by the Manual. 
The Utah Supreme Cour t r e v e r s e d the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s 
d i smissa l of t he b reach of c o n t r a c t c l a im, ho ld ing t h a t the 
Manual was r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e t o i n c o r p o r a t e c e r t a i n 
requi rements r e g a r d i n g the c r i t e r i a t o be used in s e l e c t i n g 
employees for RIF. In so holding, the Supreme Court a t l e a s t 
implied tha t a con t r ac t c la im could a r i s e from an employment 
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handbook o r manual which i s p r o m u l g a t e d c o n s i s t e n t wi th 
s t a t u t o r i l y delegated d u t i e s . ^ 
Alumbaugh submits tha t the present case i s ind is t inguishable 
from P i a c i t e l l i v . Southern Utah Sta te College, 636 P.2d 1063 
(Utah 1981), wherein the Utah Supreme Court upheld a judgment in 
favor of the P l a i n t i f f upon an implied contract claim a r i s i ng 
from al leged v io l a t i ons of the Col lege 's Personnel Pol ic ies and 
Procedures. Defendant attempts to d i s t ingu i sh P i a c i t e l l i on the 
grounds t h a t "Unlike P i a c i t e l l i , Dawn Alumbaugh i s a mer i t 
employee, and her employment r i gh t s are therefore found in the 
s t a t u t e s enac ted by the l e g i s l a t u r e , and not in any a l leged 
c o n t r a c t s . " Defendant's Brief, p . 24. 
In f a c t , P i a c i t e l l i ' s employment was subject to extensive 
s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l pu r suan t to UCA Sec t ion 53B-3-101 et_ seq . , 
which, i n t e r a l i a , author izes i n s t i t u t i o n of higher education to 
e n a c t r e g u l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o employment . UCA S e c t i o n 
53B-3-103. Similar ly , the Utah Personnel Management Act, UCA 
S e c t i o n 6 7 - 1 9 - 1 ejt s e q . , a u t h o r i z e s t h e D i r e c t o r of the 
^Defendant argues on page 23 of i t s Brief tha t the Thurston 
Court, sua spon te , r e fo rmula ted the i s s u e in t h a t case from 
breach of c o n t r a c t to s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . However, the 
T h u r s t o n Cour t a c t u a l l y c o n s t r u e d t h e a l l e g e d c o n t r a c t 
c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h t h e C o u n t y ' s s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s . I t i s 
i n d i s p u t a b l e t h a t the Thurs ton Court r eve r sed the D i s t r i c t 
Court ' s dismissal of the contrac t claim and, in so doing, implied 
t h a t a b reach of c o n t r a c t a c t i o n a r i s i n g from the Manual was 
a v a i l a b l e . 
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Department of Human Resource Management to promulgate rules 
regulating employee assignments, discipline and promotion. 
Pursuant to such authority, the Department of Human Resource 
Management has promulgated written Rules and an Employee Handbook 
which Alumbaugh alleges create an implied contract of 
employment. There is no principled basis for distinguishing 
between Piacitelli and the present case. 
Many courts have held or stated that civil service employees 
may have contractual, as well as statutory rights. Hansen 
v. White, 947 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1978); Longshore 
v. County of Venture, 157 Cal. Rptr. 706, 711 (Cal. 1979); Local 
No. 8 v. City of Great Falls, 568 P.2d 541, 545 (Mont. 1977); 
Wiles v. State Personnel Board, 121 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal. 1942); 
Helgevold v. Civil Service Com'n., 367 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Iowa 
App. 1985); Fugitt v. City of Placentia, 130 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 
(Cal. App. 1977). See generally, 15A Am.Jur.2d, Civil Service, 
Sections 47, 51 and 88. 
Defendant cites numerous cases, including Lamborn v. Jessop, 
631 P.2d 917 (Utah 1981) in support of its assertion that civil 
service employment is governed by statute and not by contract. 
However, all of the cases cited by Defendant, including Lamborn, 
involve alleged contractual rights which were in conflict with 
the controlling statutory provisions. Defendant has cited no 
authority which prohibits the Department of Human Resource 
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Management from creating contractual rights and duties which are 
consistent with and in addition to those created by the civil 
service statutes. There simply is no per se rule that a civil 
service employee may not be subject to an implied contract of 
employment of the type recognized in Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and within Alumbaugh1s 
principal Brief, dated January 13, 1993, Alumbaugh requests that 
the Order of Dismissal of the District Court be reversed and that 
this case be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this /^T day of April, 1993. 
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